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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
prosecutor by attaching limitations upon the use
of evidence which he might acquire. It has been
suggested that active participation by the prose-
cutor in the apprehension of the accused may have
an adverse effect upon both the weight and admis-
sibility of evidence gathered during his investiga-
tions, regarding which the prosecutor is required
to be a witness.2' This is particularly true when the
use of materials gathered by investigation require
that he be a witness at the trial itself. The policy
of some courts in refusing to permit the prosecuting
attorney to prosecute and testify at the same trial
is based upon a fear that the self interest of the
prosecutor, as a witness, will unduly prejudice the
jury against the accused.22 It is considered proba-
ble that the prosecutor's testimony against the
accused would be stronger and more effective than
that of any defense witness in the eyes of the jury.
By actively participating, therefore, in pre-
indictment investigations, the prosecutor may
risk his eligibility to try the case. However, if the
circumstances of the case make his testimony
essential, he can withdraw and allow other counsel
to prosecute, since in many communities there is
more than one attorney in the prosecutor's office.u
Therefore, the risk of disqualification may not in
certain cases deter the prosecuting attorney from
investigating. In addition, in many metropolitan
areas detectives and police officers attached to the
prosecutor's office render it unnecessary for him
to conduct investigations personally 2 4
Despite the absence of legislation or judicial
authority requiring him to investigate, the prose-
cutor nevertheless probably has power to under-
take any of the three possible types of investi-
gation,25 as an implied corollary to his duty to
21 In Adams v. State, 202 Miss. 68, 30 So. 2d 593
(1947), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that, al-
though it was lawful for the prosecuting attorney to
accompany the sheriff during a raid on the premises of
an alleged liquor license violator, if he chose to prosecute
the case, he should not be allowed to testify over objec-
tion by the accused.
2 In May v. Commonwealth, 285 S. W. 2d 160(Ky. 1955), where the defendant was indicted for
assaulting the prosecuting attorney, the latter was
both prosecutor and the chief witness for the state at
the defendant's trial. The court held that in order to
remove the element of self-interest another attorney
should have tried the action.
2 In Bennett v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 333, 28
S.W. 2d 24 (1930), where the prosecuting attorney
was held incompetent to testify as to violations he
had observed during a police investigation, the court
suggested that his testimony could be heard if he
withdrew from prosecuting the case.
2 See note 2, supra, and note 30, infra.25 See text at note 7, suPra.
prosecute. Since in most instances there is no legal
prohibition against the prosecutor's authority to
investigate, it is important to ascertain how the
prosecuting attorney should investigate in order
to effectively combat organized crime.
TEE PROPER METnOD OF INVESTIGATION
The needs and duties of the rural prosecutor
differ from those of the metropolitan official. For
this reason a uniform investigative procedure
would not be sufficiently flexible to satisfy the
requisites of both.
The Rural Prosecutor. In the less populous
county, the sheriff or the constable is supposed to
be the chief law enforcement officer.H However,
in some rural areas, where these officers are not
trained in the technique of modern police investi-
gation, the prosecutor may be the only public
official qualified to conduct important investiga-
tions. In such communities, therefore, the prose-
cutor, as a practical matter, must take a more
active role in criminal investigation than the
prosecutor in a larger community.28 Although in
rural counties organized crime is of lesser propor-
tions than in metropolitan areas, criminal elements
are quick to take advantage of lax or corruptible
local officials.29 Thus, it becomes the responsibility
of the rural county prosecuting attorney to exer-
cise vigilance both in insuring that the local sheriff
or constable performs his job efficiently and in
personally undertaking criminal investigations for
which those officials are not qualified.
The Urban Prosecutor. In the more populous
counties where police, sheriff, and coroner have
adequate investigatory staffs, the prosecuting
attorney should investigate only to insure that
these officials act honestly. There are several con-
siderations which render it inadvisable for the
metropolitan prosecutor to engage in unlimited
26 See, e.g., SmTh, POLICE SvsTinrs IN THE UNiTED
STATES, 83-106 (2d. ed. 1949).
" See, e.g., I ORGANIZED Cla, AND LAW ENFORCE-
mENT 252 (1952).
21 However, one might question whether the scientific
methods which must be mastered for an effective
homicide investigation, are equally as essential to
detect such obvious violations as gambling and prosti-
tution. If not, there seemingly would be no basis for
concluding that the rural county prosecutor should
have more investigative powers than the urban prose-
cuting attorney.
2 See, e.g., Senate Special Committee To Investigate
Organized Crime In Interstate Commerce, Third
Interim Report, S. RP: No. 307 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
61-63 (1951). where there is a discussion of the problems
of organized crime in a few of the smaller counties of
Illinois.
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investigation. First, the prosecuting attorney
usuall, does not have an investigative staff of
sufficient size to police the entire community.30
Second, there is unnecessary expense and duplica-
tion of effort when three or four investigative
agencies exercise overlapping jurisdictions. 3 Third,
the lack of primary and centralized responsibility
for criminal investigation may tend to promote a
division of responsibility among the various law
enforcement agencies, with a consequent avoidance
of responsibility by all.n This situation often
results in the investigative function not being ade-
quately performed by any department. Therefore,
the investigatory function of the urban prosecutor
should be limited to surveillance of other law
enforcement agencies.
When the metropolitan prosecutor receives in-
formation of the existence of criminal operations,
such as gambling, he should inform police authori-
ties, who have the primary responsibility to enforce
the law.n If the police, after receiving such infor-
30 In Cook County, Illinois, for instance, the in-
vestigative staff of the prosecuting attorney numbers
well under one hundred; whereas, the combined staffs
of the Chicago police department and Cook County
Sheriff's and Coroner's offices total close to ten thousand
trained men and women. THE CHICAGO MUNICIPAL
YEAR BOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS'
AS.SOCIATIoN 408 (1956). See also, State v. Winne,
12 N.J. 152, 190, 96 A. 2d 63, 83 (1953) (Dissenting
Opinion), where this problem was recognized by the
court.
31 See Petersen, Issues and Problems in Metropolitan
Area Police Services, 48 J. CRni. L., C. & P.S., 127
(1957); SmTrn, op. cit. supra. note 25, at 332.
2 "In metropolitan communities like Cook County,
Illinois, Los Angeles County, California, or Bergen
County, New Jersey, there is a congery of independent
local police forces covering the county.... There is no
centralized direction or control and no centralized
responsibility that a single uniform law-enforcement
policy is applied over the entire geographic area of a
county. The situation lends itself to 'buck passing' and
evasion of responsibility which can only inure to the
benefit of gangsters and racketeers." Senate Special
Committee To Investigate Organized Crime in Inter-
state Commerce, Third Interim Report, S. REP. No. 307,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. 183 (1951). The situation Senator
Kefauver found in Reading, Pennsylvania, is an ex-
imple of "buck passing" by the local authorities. In
Reading, Pa., the prosecuting attorney told the
Kefauver Committee that he thought gambling was
the responsibility of the chief of police, who said he
only acted on order from the mayor. Whereas, the
Mayor said it was up to the clergy to rid the people of
the urge to gamble. "Therefore, in Reading, with a
$5,000,000.00 annual take from gambling, the en-
forcement of the law is in the hands of God." Patterson,
The Scandal of our District Attorneys, This Week
Magazine, Jan. 23, 1952, p. 5.
3 It is not suggested that the prosecuting attorney
should personally seek out dishonest public officials
until he has received information indicating a need
for investigation.
mation, refuse to investigate or repeatedly make
unlawful raids, thus indicating collusion with the
gambling operators, the prosecutor may be able to
use this misconduct as evidence to convict the
responsible police officials.3 4 However, if there is
reason to suspect that the police make a lawful
raid but only after warning the criminals that a
raid is imminent, the proseLutor should investigate
in order to establish proof of this misconduct.3 In
order to procure evidence for prosecution in this
type of case, the prosecuting attorney must resort
to effective investigative techniques, such as sta-
tioning an undercover agent in the gambling
establishment which the police, through sham
raids made after a prior warning, have permitted
to remain in operation.36 Although this evidence
could be used against the operators of the unlawful
enterprise, the prosecutor's investigation should
have as its primary goal the conviction of the
responsible local official who has failed to perform
his job properly. The conviction of but one police
official would perhaps serve as an effective deter-
rent t6 further laxity or corruptness on the part
of other law enforcers. Such a result would be
more effective in combatting organized crime than
any attempted duplication of local police work."
3 1 In order for a raid to be lawful it must be con-
ducted with a valid search warrant so that any materials
gathered during such raid may be used as evidence
against the offenders. See, e.g., Comment, Admissibility
of Illegally Seized Evidence, 7 SRAcusE L. REv. 319
(1956).
35 The problem of convicting the local police officer
for wilful neglect of duty and incompetence is dealt
with in a succeeding section of this symposium.316 In order to trap the police officer who is warning
the gambling house before the raid, the prosecutor
should once again inform the officer of the gambling
operation. The prosecutor should then record the
precise time at which he informed the police agency of
the violation. At the same time the undercover agent
stationed in the gambling house could note the exact
time when the proprietor orders it cleared and the
gambling equipment removed. Evidence obtained by
these means would enable the prosecutor to prove the
existence of a conspiracy between the particular police
officer and the criminal offenders.
37 A related problem concerns the role which the civic
crime commissions, that is, private groups organized
to check the police, should play in aiding the prosecutor
to convict law enforcement officers linked with or-
ganized crime. Most crime commissions refuse to in-
vestigate to gather evidence for prosecution. These
organizations keep the activities of syndicate crime on
file and make regular reports on instances of criminal
violations to the prosecutor and police authorities.
However, the commissions insist that it is the function
of the police to gather evidence. Also, by revealing the
identity of their undercover agents in order to aid in the
prosecution of criminal offenders, these agents would
lose all future value as investigators for the commission
-thus, entailing a great loss of man power and money
[Vol. 48
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THE GRAND JURY AS AN INVESTIGATIVE BODY
The policy of limited investigation should not
prohibit the prosecuting attorney from investi-
gating in a general manner when directed to do so
by the grand jury. The grand jury, through its
common law and statutory powers, has broad
powers to investigate criminal activities.Y State
courts generally have held that the prosecutor
must co-operate with the grand jury in its investi-
gations.39 For this reason it has been argued that
perhaps the prosecutor should only investigate in
conjunction with the grand jury. However, it is
usually difficult to convene the grand jury, and
once convened it is limited in tenure. 40 As a result,
grand jury investigations of organized crime have
been rare.4 Thus, the prosecutor, acting solely as
an investigator under the auspices of the grand
jury, cannot be expected to contribute a great deal
to the suppression of organized crime. For this
reason, the prosecutor should not rely upon an
order from the grand jury before commencing
investigation, but rather should take immediate
action against those officials responsible for the
unlawful situation.
CONCLUSION
The prosecutor, through exercise of the investi-
gative powers of his office, should effectively check
which go into training of a competent agent. For a
thorough discussion of the operations of a civic crime
commission, see Petersen, How To Form A Citizens
Crime Commission, 17 FED. PkoB. 9 (1953).
13 For a discussion of the grand jury's investigatory
powers, see Comments, 8 BAYLOR L. REv. 194 (1956);
37 MINN. L. RPv. 586 (1953).
S9 See, e.g., State v. Platt, 193 La. 928, 192 So. 659
(1940) where the prosecutor was obliged by the court
to co-operate with the grand jury.
40 See note 38, supra. Perhaps, this infrequent use
may be attributed to the prosecutor's failure to request
that it be convened.
41 See note 38, supra.
the growth and continuance of organized criminal
activities. However, to make the most advanta-
geous use of his office, the prosecuting attorney
should investigate organized crime only to supple-
ment or keep check on those agencies which are
primarily responsible for law enforcement and
should not duplicate efforts of local police authori-
ties, or work in competition with them.
In metropolitan areas, there are strong pres-
sures which may motivate the prosecuting attor-
ney to pursue a policy of promiscuous investiga-
tion. These pressures may take the form of a
crusading, circulation-conscious press, which .has
taken a vehement stand against unchecked organ-
ized crime. Since the prosecutor's office by tradi-
tion serves as an initial step toward more ambitious
political undertakings, it is understandable that
the prosecuting attorney should desire to maintain
the best possible relations with the metropolitan
newspapers and the public. The characteristic
publicity of the office may assure the prosecutor
of a bright political future. Thus, for some prose-
cuting attorneys the desire for the publicity of
sensational investigation may overshadow any in-
clination to pursue a wiser policy of limited and
more fruitful investigation.
Perhaps the solution to the urban prosecutor's
dilemma lies in the enactment of a statute requiring
him to investigate, *but limiting his duties to the
procurement of evidence for prosecution of corrupt
or lax law enforcers, and to the gathering of evi-
dence after indictment for the purpose of prose-
cuting accused criminals. This statute should also
provide for the prosecutor to investigate if ordered
to do so by the grand jury or the attorney general.4
2 The problem of the local prosecuting attorney's
relationship with the state attorney general is ex-
amined in a succeeding section of this symposium.
In certain situations the attorney general should have
the authority to avail himself of the investigative facili-
ties and services of the local prosecutor.
LEGAL METHODS FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF ORGANIZED CRIME
I. Circumventing the Corrupt Prosecutor
LOUIS SUNDERLAND
The elimination of organized crime is basically
a problem of the enforcement of state laws. 'While
the governor is charged with executing the law and
the attorney general is the state's chief legal officer,
the prosecution of state law violations is primarily
conducted by local prosecuting attorneys. When
the local prosecutor fails to perform his duty other
methods of law enforcement must be found. Two
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of the more frequently suggested methods are
prosecution by the state attorney general or by a
special prosecutor appointed by a court.
THE ATTOR.NEY GENERALS' POWER TO PROSECUTE
The attorney generals' authority to conduct
criminal prosecutions varies among the states. In
two states he is the sole prosecutor.' In contrast,
the attorney general of Texas appears to have no
criminal jurisdiction other than to represent the
state on appeal.2 Between these two extremes fall
many degrees of power to prosecute.3 However,
the infrequent exercise of the attorney generals'
power to participate in criminal actions has
created some doubt as to the existence or adequacy
of that power.
A determination of the existence and extent of
the attorney generals' power to prosecute requires
an examination of the sources of that power.
These sources vary among the states. For instance,
one state will find such authority in the common
law, another will establish it by statute and a third
by a constitutional provision.
Common Law Powers
The office of attorney general evolved in England
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
4
Prior to this time the Crown was represented by a
number of attorneys with limited authority as to
the actions which they could initiate and the
I Only in Delaware and Rhode Island are prosecu-
tions carried on by someone other than locally elected
prosecuting attorneys. In these two states the attorney
general conducts all prosecutions through his ap-
pointed deputies. DE.. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §2501-08
(1953); R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 10, §2 (1938).
2 See TEx. CONST. art. V, §21; TEx. CODE CRIm.
PRoc. ANN. arts. 25, 26 (1954); TEx. RE v. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 1811 (1949). These provisions authorize the
district attorneys, county attorneys, and state prosecut-
ing attorneys to represent the state in all criminal cases
before the lower courts. See also State ex rel. Downs v.
Harney, 164 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), which
denies all common law powers to the attorney general.
In Sheppard, Common Law Powers and Duties of the
Altorney General, 7 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 14 (1955), the
attorney general of Texas said "... that the common
law authority of the Attorney General if such exists,
has been severely restricted by statute."
3 These variations will be considered in detail later
See note 24 infra for states granting authority to super-
vise the local prosecutor; note 27 infra for states au-
thorizing supersession; note 30 infra for states granting
concurrent power; note 34 infra for states allowing the
attorney general to advise and assist the local
prosecutor.
16 HOLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 458-81
(1924); Bellot, The Origin of the Attorney General, 25
L.Q. REv. 400 (1909); HormswoRTH, The Early History
of the Solicitor General, 13 ILL. L. REv. 602 (1919).
courts in which they could appear. The attorney
general gradually supplanted these attorneys until
he became the chief legal officer of the Crown.
Although the exact extent of his criminal juris-
diction is somewhat obscure, he undoubtedly had
broad power to initiate criminal prosecutions.5
An early American case assumed that the state
attorney general possessed the broad powers of
the English attorney general at common law.0
Subsequently, a New York court listed the powers
and duties of the state attorney general, basing its
conclusions primarily upon the description in
Blackstone's Commentaries of the powers of the
English attorney general.7 This list has been ac-
cepted as authoritative by most of those courts
which have held that the common law powers of
the English attorney general exist in their state
attorney general.8 Although this list has been relied
upon as authority for the position that the attorney
general has the power to prosecute all criminal
cases, the language used by the New York court
suggested 'that the common law power had some
undefined limitations.9
Of all the states, Pennsylvania has recognized
the most extensive common law powers in the
attorney general to conduct criminal prosecutions.
That official, who is appointed by the governor,
has been held to have the discretionary power to
supersede the prosecuting attorney, who is an
elected official. The power to supersede enables
the attorney general to replace the local prosecutor
and conduct the proceedings from the investiga-
tion stage through the trial. However, it has been
held that the Pennsylvania attorney general may
not act arbitrarily, since the exercise of his discre-
tion is subject to judicial review.10
5 See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
308-10, where the attorney general was said to possess
the authority to prosecute upon the complaint of a
citizen for "gross and notorious misdemeanors, riots,
batteries, libels, and other immoralities of an atrocious
kind .. ." See also DeLong, Powers and Duties of the
Slate Attorney General in Criminal Prosecutions, 25
J. CRIm. L. & CR OLOGY, 358, 364 (1934).
6 Parker v. May, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 336 (1850).
where it was assumed without citation that the at-
torney general could exercise the common law powers
of his English predecessor.
People v. Miner, 2 Lans. 396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen.
T. 1868). This was a civil action attempted under the
authority of statute but since the court found the
statutes did not apply they looked to the attorney
general's common law powers.
8 See note 11 infra.
9 The criminal power was said to be, "by information,
to bring certain classes of persons accused of crimes and
misdemeanors to trial." Id. at 398. (Emphasis added.)10 Appeal of Margiotti, 365 Pa. 330, 75 A.2d 465
[Vol. 48
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Attorney generals in several states have been
held to have nearly as broad common law powers
to conduct criminal prosecutions." In addition, a
majority of states have held that some common
law powers and duties have accrued to the present
office."2 While these decisions have involved powers
of a civil rather than of a criminal nature, they do
not preclude the power to conduct criminal prose-
(1950). The attorney general superseded the prosecutor
in an investigation of alleged criminal acts of public
officials in Pittsburg. He was allowed to exercise com-
plete control of the case in the investigation stage, in
proceedings before the grand jury, and the trials. See
Sheppard, Common Law Powers and Duties of th
Attorney General, 7 BAYLOR L. Rxv. 1, 16 (1955),
where the attorney general of Texas said the above
case ".. . extended the common law authority of the
Attorney General as far as has been done to date."
See also Commonwealth ex rel. Minerd v. Margiotti,
325 Pa. 17, 188 Atl, 524 (1936), for a discussion of the
historic powers of the attorney general. The listing of
common law powers found in People v. Miner, 2 Lans.
396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 1868) is cited in this case
as authority for the Pennsylvania attorney general's
criminal jurisdiction.1 See, e.g., State ex rel. Williams v. Karston, 208
Ark. 703, 187 S.W.2d 327 (1945) (injunction to restrain
criminal nuisance); State v. Finch, 128 Kan. 665, 280
Pac. 910 (1929) (full charge of prosecution when pres-
ent); Commonwealth v. Kozlowsky, 238 Mass. 279,
131 N.E. 207 (1921) (conduct and manage criminal
prosecutions); People v. Rich, 237 Mich. 481, 212 N.W.
105 (1927) (power equivalent to prosecutor); State
ex ret. Young v. Robinson, 101 Minn. 277, 112 N.W.
269 (1907) (maintain all proceedings necessary to en-
force laws); Dunn Construction Co. v. Craig, 191 Miss.
682, 2 So. 2d 166 (1941) (common law power not con-
fined to enforcement of criminal laws); State v.
McFeeley, 136 N.J.L. 102, 54 A.2d 797 (1947) (repre-
sentative of the state in prosecutions, as in England);
State v. White, 21 N.D. 444, 131 N.W. 261 (1911)
(file criminal information).
"See, e.g., State ex rel. Carmichael v. Jones, 252
Ala. 479, 41 So. 2d 280 (1950) (all common law powers
except as modified by statute); Pierce v. Superior Court,
1 Cal. 2d 759, 37 P.2d 460 (1934) (equitable action to
cancel fraudulent registrations). Darling Apartment
Co. v. Springer, 25 Del. Ch. 420, 22 A.2d 397 (1941)
(all common law powers unless restricted by statute);
State ex rel. Landis v. S.H. Kress & Co., 115 Fla. 189,
155 So. 823 (1934) (file quo warranto information);
Howard v. Cook, 59 Idaho 391, 83 P.2d 208 (1938)
(action to quiet title); Hunt v. Chicago Horse and
Dummy Ry. Co., 121 Ill. 638, 13 N.E. 176 (1887)
(enjoin railroad's use of street); Repass v. Common-
wealth ex rel. Attorney General, 131 Ky. 807, 115 S.W.
1131 (1909) (enjoin public nuisance); In re Maine
Central R.R., 134 Me. 217, 183 AtI. 844 (1936) (protect
interests of public); Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich.
444, 185 N.W. 877 (1921) (defend judge in libel action);
State ex rel. McKittrick v. Missouri Public Service
Comm'n, 352 Mo. 29, 175 S.W.2d 857 (1943) (represent
interest of state); State ex rel. Ford v. Young, 54 Mont.
401, 170 Pac. 947 (1918) (enjoin public nuisance);
In re Equalization of Assessment of Natural Gas Pipe
Lines, 123 Neb. 259, 242 N.W. 609 (1932) (to invokejurisdiction of court to review board's order); State
ex rel. Fowler v. Moore, 46 Nev. 65, 207 Pac. 75 (1922)
cutions. Usually, they have indicated that the
attorney general possesses all common law powers
except those removed by statute.
When the attorney general's powers and duties
are defined as "those prescribed by law," the
courts have construed the word "law" to include
the common law. By adopting this construction,
courts incorporate the common law powers and
duties of the attorney general into the general
statutory or constitutional provision establishing
the modem office
1 3
With the exception of Illinois, those states which
recognize the common law powers indicate .that
these powers can be limited by statute' 4 The
Illinois Supreme Court, however, has held that,
while the legislature may charge the attorney
general with new powers and duties, it cannot
strip him of any of the common law powers and
duties incident to the office. 5 The court reasoned
that since the common law powers and duties of
the attorney general were, by implication, incor-
porated into that office through a provision of the
state constitution, such powers and duties can be
divested only by constitutional amendment. The
Illinois attorney general, therefore, appears to
have broad power to prosecute criminal cases.
However, such power has been used sparingly. 6
Furthermore, the language of a recent case has
cast some doubt upon the existence of the attorney
general's criminal jurisdiction. 7 In an attempt to
(all powers at common law); Fletcher v. Merrimack
County, 71 N.H. 96, 51 AtI. 271 (1901) (power to draw
complaint not limited to statute); Gibson v. Kay,
68 Ore. 589, 137 Pac. 864 (1914) (common law powers
exist in either office of attorney general or prosecutor);
State v. Ehrlick, 65 IV. Va. 700, 64 S.E. 935 (1909)
(control of civil litigation).
"3 See, e.g., Fergus v. Russell, 270 111. 304, 110 N.E.2d
130 (1915); State ex rel. Ford v. Young, 54 Mont. 410,
170 Pac. 947 (1918).
14 See note 12 supra.
15Fergus v. Russell, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130
(1915). This was a civil action in which the court held
the legislature could take away statutory powers pre-
viously granted the attorney general but could not
remove any of the powers and duties he possessed by
virtue of the common law. See also People ex re. Board
of Trustees of University of Illinois v. Barrett, 382
Ill. 321, 46 N.E.2d 951 (1943); People ex rel. Barrett v.
Finnegan, 378 111. 387 38 N.E.2d 715 (1941); Saxby v.
Sonnemann, 318 Ill. 600, 149 N.E. 526 (1925).
"6 See, e.g., People ex re. Elliott v. Covelli, 415 111.
79 112 N.E.2d 156 (1953) (common law right to nolle
prosequi); People v. Flynn, 375 Ill. 366, 31 N.E.2d
591 (1941) (indictment obtained by attorney general
against mayor for not curbing vice quashed for lack
of specific designation of offenses); People v. Looney,
314 Ill. 150, 145 N.E. 365 (1924) (appear before grand
jury); Note, 1949 U. ILL. L. 1FoRum 507.
7 People v. Flynn, 375 Il. 366, 31 N.E.2d 591
19581
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clarify this matter, the state legislature recently
considered and rejected a bill authorizing the
attorney general, at the request of the governor,
to conduct criminal prosecutions in any county. 8
Despite the many cases and treatises recognizing
some common law powers in the modern attorney
general, a substantial minority of states deny their
attorney general all common law powers. 19 These
powers are usually rejected on the grounds that
the state official possesses only delegated rather
than implied powers. Thus, the official holds only
those powers specifically granted to him by the
state constitution or by statutes. In addition,
Indiana has held that since the office was created
by statute, its powers can only be granted by
statute .2  The New Mexico Supreme Court,
adopting a different approach, has rejected the
common law powers on the grounds that the office
of attorney general of New Mexico was created
prior to that state's adoption of the common law.21
Since the common law was not in effect when the
office was established, the court reasoned that its
creators could not have intended that the common
law powers and duties be implied as an incident
to that office.
(1941). In this case, an indictment obtained by the
attorney general was quashed. Although quashed upon
other grounds, the court said that the statutes did not
authorize the attorney general to take exclusive charge
of prosecution. The court thus implied that the at-
torney general's authority was based upon statute
rather than the common law.
IsILL. REv. STAT. c. 14, §4(4) (1955) authorizes the
attorney general to attend any criminal trial "and
assist in the prosecution" when the interest of the state
so requires. Senate Bill 9 108, 69th G.A. (1955) would
have replaced the above quoted words with, "and if the
Governor requests the attorney general in writing the
attorney general shall, in his discretion, have the right
to conduct the prosecution including, but not limited
to, any preliminary proceedings such as the presenta-
tion of evidence to or examination of witnesses before
any Grand Jury, regular or special, of any county,
with or without the acquiesience, assistance or presence
of the state's attorney."
19 See, e.g., Shute v. Frohmiller, 53 Ariz. 483, 90
P.2d 998 (1939); Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. People
ex rel. Attorney General, 5 Colo. 60 (1879); Walker v.
Georgia Ry. & Power Co., 146 Ga. 655, 92 S.E. 57(1917); Julian v. State, 122 Ind. 68, 23 N.E. 690 (1890);
Cosson v. Bradshaw, 160 Iowa 296, 141 N.W. 1062(1913); State v. Davidson, 33 N.M. 664, 275 Pac. 373
(1929); People v. Dorsey, 176 Misc. 932, 29 N.Y.S.2d
637 (County Ct. 1941); State ex rel. Haskell v. Huston,
21 Okla. 782, 97 Pac. 982 (1908), cert. denied, 215 U.S.
592 (1909); State ex rel. Downs v. Harney, 164 S.W.2d
55 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); State ex rel. Winston v.
Seattle Gas and Electric Co., 28 Wash. 488, 68 P. 946(1902); State v. Snyder, 172 Wis. 415, 179 N.W. 579
(1920).
'0 Julian v. State, 122 Ind. 68, 23 N.E. 691 (1890).
"State v. Davidson, 33 N.M. 664, 275 Pac. 373
(1929).
It has been argued in some states that common
law powers do not reside in the attorney general
at the present time because they are the product
of a different political system." Under the English
system the attorney general appointed the local
prosecutors, while, in contrast, the present day
local prosecutor is generally an elected official.
Since the methods of selecting these officials differ,
it has been argued that their powers and duties
should also differ.
All states, whether rejecting or recognizing the
existence of common law powers, have adopted
statutes granting certain specific powers and duties
to the attorney general. In some states the statu-
tory powers have been interpreted as supplanting
common law powers, while in others they have been
held to supplement the existing common law
powers."
Statutory Provisions
Supervision statutes. One of the powers assigned
to the attorney general by statute is that of super-
vising local prosecutors. 24 Such statutes usually
contain general language authorizing the attorney
general to direct and control the prosecutor in all
matters pertaining to his office. In addition to this
general supervision, the attorney general is often
specifically authorized by these statutes to inter-
vene and direct the prosecutor's actions in a
criminal proceeding. Attorney generals have con-
ducted criminal prosecutions under the authority
of such statutes;"5 however, the powers to intervene
22 See, e.g., Fergus v. Russell, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E.
130 (1915) (dissenting opinion); Appeal of Margiotti,
365 Pa. 330, 75 A.2d 465 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
2 See note 19 supra for states that have supplanted
the common law powers by statute. See notes 11 and 12
supra for states that consider the statutory provisions
as supplemental to the common law powers.
2"See ARiz. Rrv. STAT. §41-193(4) (West 1956),
which is a typical supervising provision. The attorney
general shall "exercise supervisory powers over county
attorneys of the several counties in matters pertaining
to that office and require reports relating to the public
business thereof." See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 55, §236
(1940); CAL. ANN. CODES (GOVERNMENT) §12550
(West 1954); CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 3, §49 (1935); FI.A.
STAT. ANN. §§16.01, 16.09 (1941); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§67-1401 (5) (1948); IowA CODE ANN. §13.2 (7) (1949);
LA. REV. STAT. §15.23 (1950); ME. REv. STAT. c. 20,
§1 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 32A, §2(1951); Mic. STAT. ANN. §3.183 (1952); Miss. CODE
ANN. §3845 (1942); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. §82-401
(5) (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. §84-205 (9) (1943); NEv.
Comtp. LAWS §7316 (b) (1929); N.H. STAT. ANN. §7:34(1955); N.D. REV. CODE §54-1203 (1943); S.C. CODE
§1-237 (1952); S.D. CODE §55.1501 (1939); UTAH
CODE ANN. §67-5-1 (5) (1953); VA. CODE §2-90 (1950);
VT. REV. STAT. §455 (1947); WASH. REV. CODE
§43.10.090 (1951);
25 See, e.g., Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich. 444,
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or initiate actions are exercisable at the discretion
of the attorney general.
The majority of "supervising" statutes thus
appear to nfford the attorney general adequate
powers to direct or conduct prosecutions if the
prosecutor should be reluctant to act. However,
some statutes which authorize the attorney general
to supervise the state's general legal affairs specifi-
cally exempt the prosecutor from such super-
vision. Such a statute is valueless as a basis for
the attorney general's circumvention of a corrupt
prosecutor.
Supersession statides. Another frequently dele-
gated statutory power is that of supersession of
the prosecutor by the attorney general upon the
request of the governor or the legislature.2Y Under
the language of some statutes, even though re-
quested, he can not be required to supersede.
Moreover, he is sometimes authorized to exercise
this supersession power at his discretion in the
absence of any request. The language of these
statutes indicates that the attorney general has
the authority to replace the prosecutor in any
185 N.W. 877 (1921); State ex rel. Nolan v. District
Court, 22 Mont. 25, 55 Pac. 916 (1899); State ex rel.
Miller v. District Court, 19 N.D. 819, 124 N.W. 417
(1910).
21 See, e.g., Com. GEM. STAT., §212 (1949) which
provides, "the attorney general shall have general
supervision over all legal matters in which the state is
an interested party, except those legal matters over
which prosecuting officers have direction."
2 See MicH. STAT. ANN. §3.181 (1952), which is a
typical supersession provision. "The attorney general
shall also, when requested by the governor, or either
branch of the legislature, and may, when in his ownjudgement the interests of the state require it, inter-
vene in and appear for the people of this state in any
other court or tribunal, in any cause or matter, civil
or criminal, in which the people of this state may be a
party or interested." See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 55, §235
(1940) (discretion); GA. CoNsT. §2-4502 (governor);
IowA CODE ANN. §13.2(2) (1949) (governor, legisla-
ture, discretion); KAN. GEN. STAT. §75-702 (1949)
(governor or legislature); Mime. STAT. §8;01 (1949)
(governor); NEB. REv. STAT. §84-205(9) (1943) (gover-
nor or legislature); NEv. Con. LAws §7316(c) (1929)
(governor or discretion); N.H. REv. STAT. Ame. §7:9
(1955) (governor); N.J. REv. STAT. §52:17A-5 (1955)
(governor); N.M. STAT. ANN. §4-3-3 (1953) (governor
or discretion); N.Y. ExEcuTlVE LAw §63 (2) (governor);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §114-2(1) (1952) (governor or legis-
lature); Omo REv. CODE §109.02 (1953) (governor);
OirTA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, §18b(c) (1956) (governor or
legislature); ORE. REv. STAL. §§180.070, 180.080
(1955) (governor); S.D. CODE §55.1501 (1939) (gover-
nor or legislature); WASH. REV. CODE §43.10.090
(1951) (governor); W. VA. CODE ANN. §260 (1955)
(governor); Wyo. Com. STAT. ANN. §18-910 (1945)
(governor); But see Kemp v. Stanley, 204 La. 110, 15 So.
2d 1 (1943), where a statute authorizing supersession
was held unconstitutional because it prohibited judicial
review of the attorney general's discretion.
action, whether at the investigatory or at the trial
stage. 28 This power of supersession is combined
with the supervising power in a number of states.
29
However, the supersession power alone apparently
affords the attorney general sufficient authority
to prosecute if the local prosecutor refuses. Perhaps
the essential difference between the "supervisory"
and "supersession" statutes is that the former are
primarily concerned with the prevention of mis-
conduct by the prosecutor while the latter are con-
cerned with correcting the results of such miscon-
duct. However, the threat of supersession, as well
as the supervisory power, may serve to prevent
misconduct.
Cmcurrentjurisdiction. While under the common
law and under some of the "supervising" statutes
the attorney general apparently has concurrent
jurisdiction-that is, the same powers as the local
prosecutor-a few states expressly grant him con-
current jurisdiction by statute.30 In contrast to
most supervision and supersession statutes, the
attorney general, under this type of statute ap-
parently can not replace the prosecutor. However,
he can initiate an action independently of the
local prosecutor or appear jointly in the same
proceeding with the local prosecutor.
A basic fault of concurrent jurisdiction is that
it divides the responsibility for enforcing the law."
For example, when both the attorney general and
the prosecutor are actively participating in a case
and both possess equal authority, there is a ques-
tion as to which one is in charge of the prosecu-
tion.n An even more unfortunate situation is
28The attorney general is sometimes given the
power to supersede for the purpose of enforcing a
particular statute. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §311.770
(Vernon 1949), State v. Kennedy, 343 Mo. 789, 123
S.W.2d 118 (1938); Wis. STAT. §176.90(2) (1955).
These statutes authorize the attorney general to super-
sede the prosecutor to enforce certain provisions of the
statutes pertaining to liquor control.
29Alabama, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, South Dakota, Washington.
20 See NEB. REv. STAT. §84-204 (1943) which is a
typical concurrent jurisdiction provision. "The At-
torney General and the Department of Justice shall
have the same powers and prerogatives in each of the
several counties of the state as the county attorneys
have in their respective counties." See, e.g., ME. REv.
STAT. c. 20, §9 (1954); N.D. REv. CODE §§54-1203,
1204 (1943); ORE. REv. STAT. §180.240 (1955); S.D.
CODE §34.0403 (1939); VT. REv. STAT. §463 (1947).
31 See State v. Ehrlick, 65 W. Va. 700, 64 S.W. 935
(1909), where the doctrine of concurrent powers was
rejected because "no one would be more responsible
than the other for the nonenforcement of the laws."
32 See People ex rel. Castle v. Daniels, 8 Ill. 2d 43,
132 N.E.2d 507 (1956), where there appeared to be
some disagreement between the attorney general and
the prosecutor over the entry of a nolle prosequi.
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created when both officers initiate and prosecute
the same offense simultaneously in different
courts." Any such division of responsibility allows
both officers to excuse their failure by blaming
the other.
Assist and advise statutes. Perhaps the least
significant of all statutory powers granted to the
attorney general are those requiring or allowing
him to assist, consult or advise the local prose-
cutor. 4 This assistance may take the form of
actual attendance at the trial or the preparation
of an advisory opinion. Usually these statutes
provide for this assistance at the request of the
prosecuting attorney. However, some of these
statutes also authorize the attorney general to
request the assistance of the prosecutor. They
appear to have been designed to encourage co-
operation and mutual assistance between the
two officers. Since these statutes fail to give the
attorney general much actual authority over the
prosecutor, they are of little value when the prose-
cutor fails to perform.
Department of Justice. A recent trend in legis-
lation pertaining to the powers and duties of the
attorney general has been the creation of "De-
partments of Justice" or "Departments of Law."35
3 See Dupree v. State, 14 Okla. Crim. 369, 171 Pac.
489 (1918), where the prosecutor conducted an action
in the superior court and the attorney general in the
district court. The case held that since the prosecutor's
proceedings had resulted in a verdict of not guilty a
plea of former jeopardy was a valid defense against
the attorney general's action.
34 See ILL. REV. STAT. c. 14, §4(4) (1955), which is a
typical assist and advise statute. "The duties of the
attorney general shall be... to consult with and advise
the several state's attorneys in matters relating to the
duties of their office; and when, in his judgement, the
interest of the people of the state required it, he shall
attend the trial of any party accused of crime, and
assist in the prosecution." See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.
§12-702 (1947); KAN. GEN. STAT. §75-704 (1949);
ME. REV. STAT. c. 20, §9 (1954); MASS. ANN. LAWS.
c. 12, §§6, 6A (1952); Mici. STAT. ANN. §3.183 (1952);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §27-060 (Vernon 1949); NEB. REv.
STAT. §84-205 (2) (1943); N.M. STAT. ANN. §4-3-2 (i)
(1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. §114-2 (1952); N.D. REV.
CODE §54-1201 (4) (1943); OHIo REv. CODE §109.14(1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, §18b (d) (1956); ORE.
REV. STAT. §180.060 (4) (1955); S.D. CoDE §5364
(1939); UT.A CODE ANN. §67-5-1 (7) (1953); VT. Rv.
STAT. §455 (1947); WASH. REV. CODE §43.10.030
(1951); W. VA. CODE ANN. §259 (1955); Wis. STAT.
§14.53 (3) (1955); Wyo. CoMP'. STAT. ANN. §18-905
(1945).
"5 See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. §§41-193-195 (West
1956); CAL. ANN. CODES (GOVERNMENT) §§15000-
15250 (1954); GA. CODE ANN. §§40-1612 to -1628(Supp. 1955); IowA CODE ANN. §§13.1-.9 (1949);
MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 32A (1951); NEB.
REv. STAT. §§84-201 to -210 (1943); N.J.REV. STAT.
The purpose of such reorganizations of the at-
torney generals' offices is to centralize to some
extent the law enforcement machinery of the
state. Legislation to this effect usually does nothing
more than change the name of the department
without altering the duties and powers of the
attorney general. Under this system the attorney
general usually has the same authority as that
granted by the "supervision" and "supersession"
statutes.
This department concept stems from either the
United States Department of Justice or the English
system of prosecution.36 However, under the
departmental system, in contrast to the federal
or English systems, the local prosecutors remain
elected officialsY The attorney general's control
over a locally elected prosecutor will be sub-
stantially less than that over a prosecutor ap-
pointed by him. For this reason, statutes creating
departments of justice or departments of law
have generally resulted in little significant im-
provement in state law enforcement. But there is
evidence that attorneys general operating under
such statutes have been able to increase coordi-
nation among local law enforcement officials.3a
Failure of Existing Powers
The local prosecutor has the primary duty to
prosecute all violations of the law within his
jurisdiction, even when the laws are looked upon
with disfavor by local citizens.39 Since he some-
§§52.17A-1 to -20 (1937); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§114.1-.18
(1952); ORE. R v. STAT. §§180.210-.240 (1955); PA.
STAT. ANN. fit. 71, §§291-300 (1942); R.I. GEN. LAWS
c. 5 §§26, 27 (1938).
36See, e.g., EASBY-SmTH, THE DEPARTMENT OF
JusTIcE, (1904); HowARD, CRrnUNAL JUsTIcE IN
ENGLAND (1931); Brownell, As a Newcomer Sees The
Department of Justice, 8 REcoRD 219 (1953); Burger,
The Oqice of the United States Attorney General, 2 LA.
B. J. 124 (1954).
37 Rhode Island is an exception, see note 1 supra.
u See 1949 Proceedings of the Conference of The
National Association of Attorneys General 25-31, where
the limits and benefits of the California Department of
Justice are reported by their attorney general. The
main benefit of the departmental system is here de-
scribed as the mutual understanding of their problems
obtained by local officials who attend meetings called
by the attorney general. See also WILLOUGHBY, PRINCI-
PLES OF JUDIcIAL ADImNISTRATION 121 (1929), where
such departments are criticized as having only the most
general supervisory powers. Stark, Politics and the State
Department of Justice 30 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMAIoLoGY
182 (1939), describing the short lived South Dakota
Department and discussing some of the reasons that led
to its disbandment.
1 See, State ex rel. Johnston v. Foster, 32 Kan. 14,
43 Pac. 534, 538, a.f'd, 112 U.S. 201 (1884): "If a law
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times shrinks from this primary duty, it is not
surprising to find the attorney general avoiding
what are at most vague secondary responsibilities
in regard to criminal prosecution. Moreover, the
attorney general is subject to pressures in addition
to those which may make the prosecutor reluctant
to act. These pressures are particularly effective
since the attorney general's powers are exercisable
at his discretion. Of course, if he exercises his
discretion by participating in a criminal prosecu-
tion, his actions are subject to court review. On
the other hand, the permissive language of the
statutes may prevent the courts from reviewing
the attorney general's failure to exercise his
powers. Therefore, even when he has adequate
power to circumvent the local prosecutor, he can
not be required to exercise this power.
Perhaps the foremost reason for the attorney
general's reluctance to prosecute is that he is
unaware of conditions in the local prosecutor's
office. In order to effectively exercise his super-
vision and supersession powers he must know
something about the particular activities of the
prosecutor. A number of states have adopted a
reporting system in an effort to keep the attorney
general informed of the prosecutor's actions.40
However, these reports only inform the attorney
general of completed actions, such as the number
of arrests, indictments and convictions. They do
not inform the attorney general of conditions in
the community caused by the prosecutor's in-
action. In addition, such reports probably come too
late to enable the attorney general to prevent
inadequate prosecution or to intervene before a
case is terminated. Another method of appraising
the local situation would require the attorney
enacted by the legislature has not the support of
public sentiment, this may be, under some cArcum-
stances, a reason for its amendment or repeal, but it is
not a good defense for a county attorney, upon whose
lips is fresh the oath of office, for refusing to attempt its
enforcement."
40 See, e.g., AIz. Rv. STAT. §41-193 (4) (West 1956)
(on demand); ARE. STAT. ANN. §12-705 (1947) (bien-
nial); CAL. CONST. art. 5, §21, CAL. ANN. CODES
(GOVERNMENT) §12550 (1954) (on demand); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §16.09 (1941) (quarterly); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§67-1401 (5) (1948) (on demand); IowA CODE ANN§13.2 (7) (1949) (on demand); LA. RE.v. STAT. §§15:24,
15:576 (1950) (annual and monthly); Micir. STAT. ANN.
§3.184 (1952) (probably annual); MINN. STAT. §388.07(1949) (annual); MoNT. R v. CODE ANN. §82-401 (5)
(1947) (on demand); NEv. Con. LAWS §7316 (b) (1929)
(on demand); N.H. STAT. ANN. §7:38 (1955) (annual);
TEx. CODE CRim. PRoc. art. 47 (1954) (on demand);
UTAH CODE ANN. §67-5-1 (5) (1953) (on demand);
W. VA. CODE ANN. §260 (1955) (on demand).
general to periodically inspect the operation of the
prosecutor's office. Such inspection would be
aimed at evaluating the effect of the prosecutor's
activities upon local law enforcement. However,
the attorneys general frequently lack sufficient
personnel and funds to effectively make such
investigations.A
The fact that both the attorney general and the
prosecutor are elected officials may be an ad-
ditional reason for the reluctance of the attorney
general to exercise his authority. The attorney
general could control a prosecutor whom he ap-
pointed much more effectively than one who has
been elected by the local community. Furthermore,
the attorney general's control over the local prose-
cutor may be hampered by political considerations.
Frequently the prosecutor is a powerful political
figure in his local community and the state ad-
ministration is hesitant to embarrass him or to
incur his wrath. On the other hand, if the prose-
cutor is of a different political party, there are
some indications that the attorney general may
use his powers as a political weapon. 42
There may also be personal motives and am-
bitions which influence the attorney general's
exercise of his powers. While one can imagine
instances where the publicity attendant upon
intervention in a highly publicized criminal case
would benefit an official's career, an attorney
general's political future is probably better served
by confining his activities to civil law. Certainly,
a politically conscious attorney general might be
reluctant to become involved in an investigation
of the relationship between organized crime and
local political officials. Furthermore, as long as
his office remains civil in nature he can avoid
responsibility for the performance of law enforce-
ment officers. 0 It is probably factors such as these
which have caused at least one attorney general to
deny the existence of any criminal authority in
his office.44
41 See, e.g., 1949 Proceedings of the Conference of the
National Association of Attorney General 28; DeLong,
Powers and Duties of the State Attorney General in
Criminal Prosecutions, 25 J. Cw. L. & CpmoNLorY
358, 397 (1934).4 ' See, e.g., Appeal of Margiotti, 365 Pa. 330, 75
A.2d 465 (1950) (dissenting opinion), 99 U. PA. L. REv.
826; DeLong, supra note 41, at 386.
42 See 1949 Proceedings of the Conference of the Na-
tional Association of Attorneys General 25, for a discus-
sion of the increased responsibilities under a department
of justice system.
44 2 AMERICAN BAR. AssoCATIoN, ORGANIZED
CI AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 105 (1953), where the
attorney general of Connecticut is quoted.
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In addition to the various reasons why the
attorney general is reluctant to exercise his powers
of criminal prosecution, there may often be con-
siderable resistance to such action by local citizens
as well as local officials. A strong tradition oi
home rule exists in most communities. Such com-
munities may view with suspicion any attempt
by the state government to increase its powers at
the expense of local officials. Furthermore, in
many states the larger metropolitan areas by
tradition and custom have become areas of local
law enforcement exclusively. These factors, coupled
with the hostility of citizens to the policy and
purpose of certain laws designed to control gam-
bling and the sale of liquor, make it difficult
for the attorney general to effectively enforce the
law at the local level.
Summary
There has been a trend in recent years towards
greater centralization of the machinery of law
enforcement and prosecution.45 Suggestions for
centralization often include abolishing the elective
office of prosecutor and authorizing the attorney
general to appoint the local prosecutors. Although
there are advantages to centralized responsibility,
such a system would not necessarily insure honest
prosecution. State law enforcement officials have
shown themselves to be no more immune to cor-
ruption than local officials.4 Furthermore, the
appointed prosecutor would very likely lack the
initiative and responsibility of the locally elected
official.47 The most recent plan for centralization
has come from the Commission on Organized Crime
of the American Bar Association. After a detailed
study of the problems involved, a model act was
formulated which was designed to place super-
vision by the state of local law enforcement and
prosecution on a sound statutory basis. 48 This
model act would give the attorney general ade-
quate power to supervise and supersede the prose-
45 See, e.g., WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES or JUDICIAL
ADmNISTRATION 119-24 (1929); NATIONAL COMIS-
SION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT
ON PROSEcUTION, No. 4, at 13 (1931); Warren, A State
Department of Justice, 21 A.B.A.J. 495 (1935); A merican
Bar Association Recommendations 25 J. CRm. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 465 (1934).
46 See, e.g., DeLong, supra note 41, at 399; Senate
Special Committee To Investigate Organized Crime In
Interstate Commerce, Third Interim Report, S. REP. No.
307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 40, 84-90, 106-08 (1951).
47 See AMERICAN LAW STUDENT ASSOCIATION,
LAWYERS' PROBLEMS OF CONSCIENCE 66, 70 (1953).
4 2 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ORGANIZED CRIME
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 93-133 (1953).
cuting attorney. The adoption of such an act would
be appropriate in those states which have failed,
as yet, to grant their attorneys general adequate
authority. However, such legislation alone is not a
satisfactury solution to the problem of the prose-
cuting attorney's failure to perform. The attorney
general must have not only the power to conduct
criminal prosecutions but must be required to
exercise this power in appropriate instances. He
should be required to exercise his authority
whenever misconduct in a particular prosecutor's
office becomes evident. When charged with a spe-
cific duty the attorney general would be more likely
to act than when merely possessing a discretionary
power. Furthermore, in some situations a writ
of mandamus might be obtained to compel
action. 49
APPOINTENT OF A SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
An alternative to prosecution by the attorney
general when the local prosecutor refuses to act,
is the appointment of a special prosecutor. It is
generally recognized that courts possess an in-
herent power to appoint a special prosecutor from
the attorneys who appear before the court.50 This
power is based upon the rationale that it is neces-
sary to prevent a failure to prosecute in those
cases where the regular prosecutor fails to appear
in court for that purpose. However, such power
appears to have been exercised only in those in-
stances where the prosecutor is merely absent, or
when the office is vacant, rather than when the
prosecutor fails or refuses to perform. However,
since the effect of a prosecutor's failure or refusal to
49 The courts have indicated a reluctance to issue a
mandamus compelling the prosecutor to perform his
duties. No doubt this reluctance is caused by the diffi-
culties in effectively enforcing such an order. The same
problem would be found when a mandamus was issued
to the attorney general. However, such writs have been
issued to compel the prosecutor to act. See, e.g., Board
of Supervisors v. Simpson, 36 Cal. 671, 227 P.2d 14(1951) (to compel the prosecutor to abate a nuisance);
Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Hipple, 69
Pa.9 (1881) (tocompel the prosecutor to conductcriminal
prosecutions); State ex rel. Brown v. Warnock, 12
Wash. 2d 478, 122 P.2d 472 (1942) (to compel the
prosecutor to conduct quo warranto proceedings).
50 See e.g., Taylor v. State, 49 Fla. 69, 38 So. 380
(1905); Wilson v. County of Marshall, 257 Ill. App.
220 (1930); Dukes v. State, 11 Ind. 556 (1858); Tesh v.
Commonwealth, 34 Ky. (4 Dana) 522 (1836); State v.
Jones, 306 Mo. 437, 268 S.W. 83 (1924); Territory v.
Harding, 6 Mont. 323, 12 Pac. 750 (1887); State ex ret.
Thomas v. Henderson, 123 Ohio St. 474, 175 N.E. 865(1931); Nance v. State, 41 Okla, Crim. 379, 273 Pac.
369 (1929); State v. Ganthier, 113 Ore. 297, 231 Pac.
141 (1924).
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